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Abstract. Threats to global cyber security, including physical, personnel, and 
information, continue to evolve and spread across a hyper-connected world, 
irrespective of international borders, in both their elaboration and the scale of 
their impact. This cyber domain represents a constant challenge to national 
security, as its socio-technical components are both real and cognisant. The 
exacerbation of cyber-attacks undermines countries’ stability, its escalation 
produces a landscape of genuine global threat, and the magnitude of its 
expanding attack mechanisms creates a ‘tsunami effect’ on national cyber 
defenses. This paper reviews the current politically unstable state of Spring 
Land’s cyber security capacity, utilising Interactive Management (IM) 
approach. It reports the findings of an IM session conducted during a workshop 
involving a total of 26 participants from the Spring Land National Cyber 
Security Authority (NCSA), other government agencies. The workshop utilised 
different IM techniques, such as Idea Writing (IW), Nominal Group Technique 
(NGT), and Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM). Using trigger questions, 
based on the dimensions of the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CCMM), a set of objectives was derived to contextualise and support 
identified the key initiatives for the development  of national cyber security 
capacity in the country. 
Keywords: Cyber Security, Cyber Security Maturity Models, Cyber Security in 
Spring Land, Interactive Management. 
1 Introduction 
Over the last decades the global security environment has been characterised by sev-
eral security insufficiencies, which are defined as a government’s inability to meet its 
national security onuses [1]. The security insufficiencies lead to the state instability. 
Unstable states are clear and often dramatic examples of unsuccessful governance and 
public supervision failure [2]. Generally, an unstable state is characterised by: civil 
war; political and economic upheaval-al; absence of law; lack of a reliable body that 
represents the state beyond its borders at the inter-national level [2, 3]. Global Securi-
ty (Physical, Personnel and Information) threats are continuing to evolve and spread 
across our hyperconnected world, irrespective of any international borders, in both 
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their elaboration and scale of impact. The threats to any nation’s infrastructure of 
networked information systems fluctuate from degrees of disablement to complete 
debility[4, 5]. Annual Global Risk reports published by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) demonstrate an increased annual technological risk, such as data fraud, cyber 
terrorism, cyber-attacks, and Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) breakdown [6]. 
Therefore, it is crucial identify potential cyber threats with the potential to have a 
detrimental rippling effect on various aspects of society and global security.  
The aim of this paper is to contextualise the state of the national cyber security ca-
pacity maturity levels within unstable environments and provides guidance on moving 
forward to the higher levels, employing Spring Land as an exemplar case study. 
Spring Land is a fictional name given to the country from which this real case study is 
conducted. The paper utilizes the Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model (CCMM)  
for Nations, originally proposed by the Cyber Security Capacity Centre at the Univer-
sity of Oxford [7], as a baseline. The ultimate aim of the paper is to provide bench-
mark for measuring and planning cyber security for unstable environments.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses related research, Section 3 
presents the approach of the present study, and the results of the Interactive Manage-
ment (IM) sessions are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 provides a discus-
sion and conclusions.  
2 Related Research 
2.1 Cybersecurity at a Nation-State Level  
Cyber strategic stability has become a central issue for many countries, and it is in-
creasingly imperative that it is strategically correlated, in leading economies, such as 
the United Kingdom (UK), NATO and the United States (US)[4]. Cyber security was 
defined by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as: the collection of 
tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management 
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be 
used to protect the cyber environment and organisations and user’s assets [8]. US 
President Obama’s (2013) Executive Order 13636 “Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity” addressed the threats the US faces in cyberspace [9]. President Obama 
stressed that nations must remain vigilant, and ensure the resilience of their complex 
critical infrastructure systems, whether physical or cyber, by mitigating the threats 
and fissures that can weaken them. This Executive Order altered the approach of 
many security practices in terms of how and where cyber issues are addressed, im-
proving the resilience of the national critical infrastructure.  
Meanwhile, in 2013, allowing for the significance of Critical Information Infra-
structures  (CIIs), the European Union (EU) created a practical guide concerning na-
tional cyber security strategies (NCSS), later updating it in 2016 to solidify the CIIs’ 
status in neutralising terrorist cells [10]. This CIIs guide helped EU member states to 
develop their own robust national cyber resilience capability, thereby acknowledging 
the existence of cyber threats and their risk to national security.  
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Cyberspace is the 5th domain, alongside land, sea, air, and space, in modern war-
fare at the operational level, as soldiers are increasingly reliant on digital capacity, 
and also at the strategic level, since a state’s weaknesses and strengths in cyberspace 
can be employed to deter and affect the strategic balance of power. Nation-states em-
ploy cyber weapons directly to disrupt other nation-states’ critical infrastructure and 
computer systems[11].  
Researches demonstrated that the motivation behind most cyber-attacks in 2017 
was driven by cybercrime, hacktivism, cyber espionage, cyber terrorism, and cyber 
warfare [12]. The upsurge in cyber espionage has become a significant factor inform-
ing Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic in the regard to the art of war, 
due to the development of cyber technology, and the transformation of traditional 
means of intelligence into cyber espionage. Terrorists and spies can now employ 
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) in the cyber domain, as a means to gather infor-
mation that is not disclosed publicly, as world leaders are acutely aware of, and com-
plain publically about, the potential damage to intellectual property posed by cyber 
espionage [13]. With regards to cyber-attacks we differentiate: ‘cyber terrorism’ 
which uses computers as weapons, or targets, by politically motivated international, 
or sub-national groups who  cause violence and fear in order to influence an audience, 
or cause a government to change its policies [14]; and cyber warfare, which refer-
ences attacks conducted by nation-state actors [15]. 
2.2 Cyber Security in Spring Land 
To date, Spring Land authorities have been unable to reinforce their security position, 
or to enhance their cyber security to meet this demand and its associated criminal, 
malicious, or state-inspired risks of increased online activity. In 2013, the Spring 
Land government officially established the National Cyber Security Authority 
(NCSA), the primary mission of which was to encourage and sustain the secure use of 
digital services, together with preventing, detecting, and responding effectively to the 
associated cyber risks [16] . In the same year, with the support of (ITU), Spring Land 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was established with national-level 
responsibilities, and is in charge of prevention, detection, and mitigation of cyber 
threats. Due to the current political conflict and austerity measures, NCSA faces a 
lack of funding, which hinders its attempts to advance cyber security [17]. Thus, its 
ability to address cyber security concerns at any level does not inspire sufficient pub-
lic confidence. The onus is now on the Spring Land Homeland Security apparatus to 
prevent any possible terrorist threats, and to preserve and protect the country’s critical 
infrastructure through applying coherent strategy shared by all the relevant depart-
ments. 
2.3 Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations (CCMM) 
Assessing the risk of national critical infrastructure has gained increasing attention. 
The assessment and detection of cyber threats is conducted though CCMMs [18]. 
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Various types of CCMM exist, such as the International Organisation for Standardisa-
tion’s Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity framework, and 
the US Department of Energy’s Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) 
[18].The majority of these frameworks are employed at an organisational level; 
whereas the CCMM proposed by the Cyber Security Capacity Centre at the Universi-
ty of Oxford is employed at a national level, and has been deployed to review cyber 
security capacity in over 40 countries [7]. Developed through collaboration with in-
ternational stakeholders, this academic model is politically neutral, offering a com-
prehensive analysis of cybersecurity capacity through five different dimensions: (i) 
Cyber Security Policy and Strategy; (ii) Cyber Culture and Society; (iii) Cyber Secu-
rity Education, Training, and Skills; (iv) Legal and Regulatory Frameworks; and (v) 
Standards, Organisations, and Technologies. Each dimension includes multiple fac-
tors and attributes, each making a significant contribution to capacity building. 
Meanwhile, each factor, involves five stages of maturity, with the lowest indicator 
implying a non-existent, or inadequate, level of capacity, and the highest indicating 
both a strategic approach, and ability to dynamically enhance against environmental 
considerations, including operational, socio-technical, and political threats [7]. These 
dimensions were employed when establishing the trigger questions in the present 
study’s IM workshop, in order to capture feedback from the participants, and to con-
textualise the problem space, centred on the Spring Land case study. 
3 Research Method 
The aim of this case study was to review the current state of Spring Land’s cyber 
security capacity utilizing an approach called Interactive Management (IM). This case 
study is an example of a Socio-Technical System (STS) of unstable environment.  
According to Baxter and Sommerville [19], the STS considers human, social and 
structural factors, as well as technical factors in the design of organisational systems. 
This is supported by Appelbaum and Trist [20] by claiming that STS design functions 
on the presumption that an organisation is a combination of social and technical parts 
open to its environments. IM was chosen for this reason for the present study, and is 
discussed further in the following section. 
3.1 Interactive Management (IM) 
The IM technique concerns complex situations requiring a group of people, who are 
knowledgeable in terms of the situation, to collaborate in tackling the main aspects of 
an issue, to develop a deep understanding of the situation under analysis, and to detail 
the basis for effective action [21]. The concept was developed by Warfield and 
Christakis[22] in 1980.  IM involves three phases; the planning phase: in this phase, 
the situation is defined, and the scope of the issue clarified [21].The workshop phase: 
this phase involves uniting a group of participants in an understanding of the issue, or 
situation. According to Ward, et al. [23], the IM workshop involves three procedures: 
Idea Writing (IW), Nominal Group Technique (NGT), and Interpretive Structural 
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Modelling (IS) [21, 24]. In IW, a trigger question is provided to the participants, 
about which they are invited to silently compose their ideas in a written form. This is 
followed by the NGT, in which the participants generate further ideas, based on the 
more holistic view of the problem gained from the IW. The final part of the workshop 
involves transforming the idea statements into objectives, and then building an Inter-
pretive Structural Model (ISM) to identify the relationships between the various items 
surrounding the problem. The follow-up phase: in this phase, the outcome and the 
objectives derived from the previous phase are initiated, commencing the implemen-
tation plan towards a solution. 
3.2 Participant’s profile 
In this present study, a one-day workshop hosted by NCSA was conducted with a 
total of 26 participants (25 male, 1 female) from different stakeholders. The age of 
participants was between 25 – 55 years old.  NCSA issued an invitation letter to all of 
the stakeholders to help the researcher to contextualise the problem space, which fea-
tured the current state of Spring Land’s homeland security. The participants were 
selected due to their contributions in their decision making roles, and included gov-
ernment officials, managers, and general employees participating in security devel-
opment from areas such as Defence, e-services, Private Sector, Banking, Digital 
Crime Unit, Oil and Gas sector and Intelligence agency.   
4 Results 
4.1 Idea Writing (IW) Results 
IW was employed to reveal the issues relating to a given a trigger question, providing 
the participants with a forum to brainstorm and exchange ideas. The participants were 
divided randomly into three groups to discuss the question, and to provide their views 
concerning the issues relating to cyber security in Spring Land. The trigger question 
employed was: What are the current issues of cyber security in Spring Land? After 
the session, the statements produced were numbered, merged and organised, then 
sorted into categories, according to each of the CCMM dimensions. Table 1, below, 
presents the list of shortcomings to face in unstable environments taking Spring Land 
as a case study. 
Table 1. Unstable Environments Vs CCMM Dimensions  
D1 - Cyber Security Policy and Strategy 
D1.1. Lack of a national cyber security strategy; 
D1.2. Unavailability  of a national risk management plan, and threat of cyberspace,  
has not been identified on the national or sector-specific level; 
D1.3. Deficiency of a national roadmap for a cyber defence strategy; 
D1.4. Difficulty in implementing the cyber security strategy, due to political issues, 
and scarcity of resources; 
D1.5. Absence of a public and private partnerships for sharing information; 
D1.6. Miss of a national crisis management protocol and incident response plan for 
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national critical infrastructure assets, and this has not been prioritised; 
D1.7. Lack of a national cyber security framework for monitoring the adoption of 
international cybersecurity standards in the government sectors. 
D2 - Cyber Culture and Society 
D2.1. Lack of a cyber security culture, and the absence of an understanding of 
cyber-risk and its consequences in public and private sectors, and decision makers; 
D2.2. Lack of awareness-raising programmes on the governmental level; 
D2.3. Citizens’ confidence in the use of e-government services is weak. 
D3 - Cyber Security Education, Training, and Skills 
D3.1. Dearth of experienced people to train and teach cyber security programmes, 
and migration of experiences, due to the security situation in the country; 
D3.2. Lack of a national plan or curriculum in the education system that meets the 
needs of the cyber security environment; 
D3.3. Education outputs in the cyber security domain are weak, and focus only on 
technical issues; 
D3.4. Absence of training collaboration between the public and private sector; 
D3.5. Lack of a strategic view of cybersecurity capacity building. 
D4 - Legal and Regulatory Frameworks 
D4.1. Non-existence of cybersecurity legislation or regulations to protect personal, 
commercial, and governmental data. In addition, the initiatives to issue laws related 
to cyber security face difficulties, resulting from the political situation; 
D4.2. Lack of legislation or regulations for reporting breaches and abuses of cyber-
space; 
D4.3. Absence of a legislative system, due to unrest in the political situation; 
D4.4. Poor cooperation between the authorities in the Ministries of Justice and Inte-
rior, especially in the field of digital criminal investigation; 
D4.5. Absence of human rights law concerning cyberspace; 
D4.6. Lack of an official national framework for the reporting or sharing of tech-
nical vulnerabilities; 
D4.7. Insufficiency of specific legislation concerning cybercrime, and lack of courts 
to handle cybercrime cases; 
D4.8. Shortage of resources and expertise for digital crime investigation. 
D5 - Standards, Organisations, and Technologies 
D5.1. Lack of use of the information security management systems (ISMS), in all 
governmental sectors, except for a telecommunications provider  
D5.2. Most government sectors use technologies and applications provided by third 
parties and international companies, without heeding the need to review the security 
vulnerabilities in the systems; 
D5.3. Lack of a national agency for digital certification;  
D5.4. Absence of national benchmarking, auditing, and risk assessment policy; 
D5.5. Lack of a national infrastructure resilience plan. Military and political con-
flicts have severely affected the resilience of the infrastructure, and exposed the 
telecommunications, electricity, and water sectors to destruction or theft. 
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4.2 Nominal Group Technique  (NGT) Results  
The NGT technique was employed to generate and obtain an initial rating of a set of 
objectives. Following the organising and numbering of the IW, the participants were 
required to transform their ideas into a set of objectives, which were used to create an 
interpretive structural model (ISM), and to summaries the interactions between them. 
The final part of the workshop employed the NGT, requiring the participants to select 
their top three objectives from the list for each dimension, with one being the least 
important, and three the most important. A total of 19 of the participants then voted 
on the objectives, although seven of the participants failed to vote, owing to external 
commitments or issues. Table 2 shows the three most important objectives from each 
CCMM dimension. 
Table 2. CCMM Vs Three Top Priority Objectives 
Dimension Objective Total 
D1 
D1.1. Adopt a national cyber security framework. 41 
D1.3. Establish a central committee to design a national 
roadmap for a cyber defence strategy. 
37 
D1.6. Create a national list of CNI assets, and identify the risk 
priorities. 
13 
D2 
D2.2. Develop a national awareness program that is compatible 
with the current situation, targeting all of society. 
40 
D2.3. Encourage all stakeholders to run regular awareness-
raising campaigns.  
39 
D2.4. Improve e-services, in order to promote the required 
level of trust, and improve the application of security measures. 
20 
 
D3 
D3.1. Develop national cyber security education and cyber 
security modules. 
40 
D3.2. Provide a sufficient budget for capacity building. 39 
D3.4. Classify training needs, and develop cyber exercises and 
drills. 
12 
D4 
D4.1. Draft national laws and regulations relating to digital 
crime. 
40 
D4.2. Create a strong national legal framework for the sharing 
of information incidents, vulnerability disclosure, and report-
ing. 
31 
D4.3. Build and strengthen national capacity in law enforce- 27 
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ment. 
D5 
D5.1. All stakeholders to adapt and adopt international stand-
ards, such as ISO27000. 
39 
D5.2. Create a national risk assessment, crisis management, 
and auditing framework. 
31 
D5.5.Enhance physical security. 26 
4.3 Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM) 
The ISM technique helped the participants to examine the inter-relationships between 
the elements gained through the NGT process, and provided a structure for tackling 
its complexity [25]. The ISM is an acknowledged methodology for classifying rela-
tionships among a set of interconnected criteria, which define a problem or an issue 
[26]. In order to create a clear ISM, the objectives were grouped by similarity, to fa-
cilitate the identification of the three most important objectives from each dimension, 
which are presented in Table 2. The ISM, derived from the objective statements and 
their interactions based on the dimensions of the CCMM, is represented in Fig.1.  
As can be observed from Fig.1, the development of a national blueprint is deemed 
to be important because current state interactions in cyberspace manifest the lack of 
national cyber frameworks. The results in Fig.1 also show that the group considered 
that the provision of a robust national awareness programme, which targets the whole 
society, would be a significant factor in improving national cyber security. The group 
believed that the creation of a national strategy framework would drive the creation of 
an effective national legal framework, which would assist in the improvement of in-
formation sharing, incident vulnerability disclosure, and reporting between govern-
mental sectors. Furthermore, the group decided that enhancing physical security 
would also help to increase the national and organisational capability to resist and 
react to internal and external threats. 
5 Conclusion and Future Work  
In this paper we explored the main characteristics of Spring Land cyber security as an 
example of unstable STS. We used IM-based approach. IM provided a rational 
grounding in the current cyber security challenges in Spring Land, and how they 
should be addressed. The set of problem statements and objectives derived from the 
IM approach can be employed to support the management of a national cyber security 
capacity in an unstable environment, similar to the case study exemplar presented 
herein. However, these results require further validation and generalisable data, which 
will be addressed in a future study. The relationships between objectives from ISM 
will be analysing using the adjacency matrix and create a reachability matrix. In addi-
tion, development of a meta-model based on the Interpretive Structural Model (ISM) 
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developed for an unstable environment. The modelling approaches such as IDEF0, 
UML, SysML, Data Flow Diagrams and Flow Charts can be used to decompose the 
ISM into further applied functional models. 
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Fig 1.  Interpretive structural modelling for unstable ennviroment 
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